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Approved For Release 2001/08/14 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010065-7

14 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director/National Estimates

SUBJECT : Board Estimate of Allied Reactions to Certain Courses of Action Relating to Berlin

1. As a result of Planning Board discussion of the revised policy paper on Berlin, it has become clear that there is a latent difference of opinion as to the reactions of the UK, France, and West Germany to a US proposal to use force promptly in the event of a renewed Berlin blockade. State's view is that it would require a full testing of alternative measures, including resort to an airlift, and a waiting period of at least 3-4 months, before these countries would accept the use of force to test the blockade and reopen access. Other members of the Planning Board - and some members of the Council - have apparently been relying on a belief that in the last analysis our Allies would have to go along with the prompt use of force even if no full airlift had been instituted.

2. Accordingly the Planning Board has asked that DCI give his view on this point when the matter comes before the Council. The Board is asked to prepare a short memorandum, not more than 2-3 pages in length (exclusive of Statement of Assumptions) as to be suitable for reading aloud at the Council, in general accordance with the attached Terms of Reference, which are designed to reflect the details of the proposed policy and of the situation in which that policy would be applied.

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ROBERT AMORY, JR.

Deputy Director/Intelligence

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TERMS OF REFERENCE: SPECIAL BOARD ESTIMATE RE BERLIN

Problem

To estimate the reactions of the UK, France, and West Germany to a US proposal for the prompt use of forceful measures in the event of a Soviet blockade or action tantamount to a blockade of Berlin.

Assumptions

1. That Soviet or East German measures have reached a point threatening the access to Berlin of the Western Allies, West Germany, or both.
2. That the Western Allies have held the Soviets responsible for these measures, and have affirmed their right and intent to maintain their positions in Berlin and unrestricted access thereto, and their objection to the Soviet or East German measures, which have nonetheless been continued or increased.
3. That the US and the Western Allies have not instituted an airlift to supply Berlin, (other than for purposes such as personnel transfer, special needs, etc.).
4. That, by virtue of its stockpile, Berlin is not in physical distress or in prospect of being so within a period of 3 to 6 months.
5. That the US proposal calls for the use of limited military force, initially "to the extent necessary to determine Soviet intentions" (e.g., by armed convoy under orders not to shoot except in self-defense), thereafter "to attempt to reopen access to Berlin" (e.g., by armed convoy under orders to shoot if prevented from going through). In either case the US would make clear to its allies its belief "that Berlin is not militarily defensible and that if determined Soviet armed opposition should develop when US units attempt to force their way into or out of Berlin, no additional forces would be committed, but resort would have to be made to general war."
6. That the US would propose, or would already have initiated, measures to step up US readiness for war.

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Questions Presented

The basic question is whether the UK, France, and West Germany would (a) concur in the proposal; (b) oppose it but acquiesce; or (c) reject the proposal and deny that resulting hostilities created a casus belli within the North Atlantic Treaty. In making the estimate it will obviously be necessary to consider both official and popular reaction, but the basic estimate should be what the government of the country will in fact do, having regard to its own public opinion and all other factors. It may be necessary to note any significant popular disagreement with the estimated governmental decision, to the extent that such disagreement might later seriously affect continued governmental support of US action.

An important question, not covered in the given assumptions, is whether the US would expressly state to its allies that it would go it alone if they did not accept the proposal. If the Board thinks such an affirmation would affect the result, alternative assumptions may be used.

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